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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how John 
Adams's political philosophy influenced his ideas on 
diplomacy, and how his experiences as a diplomat during the 
American Revolution affected his political philosophy.
John Adams was a republican, which, among other 
things, meant that he was committed to the idea of a 
balance between branches of government to preserve liberty. 
Similarly, Adams believed that a balance of power among 
nations was necessary to preserve American independence. 
Adams also believed that virtue was necessary for a 
republic. However, as the United States became more 
dependent on its French ally, Adams came to realize that 
Americans were not especially virtuous, and believed even 
more in the need for a balance of power. Political 
philosophy and diplomatic experience reinforced each other, 
in that they both led Adams to the conclusion that a 
balance of power was essential to preserve liberty and 
independence.
v
A REPUBLICAN ABROAD:
JOHN ADAMS AND THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
Throughout his public career, John Adams remained a 
committed republican. Republicanism, to Adams and his 
contemporaries, meant more than just abolishing a 
hereditary monarch and nobility. Republicanism was an 
ideology that shaped the way its adherents viewed the 
world. Belief in the eternal struggle between power and 
liberty, and in the need for public virtue to support 
liberty, were at the center of republican ideology.1 John 
Adams's thought fell within these general guidelines, and 
Adams made the need for a balance of power to preserve 
liberty a central theme in his theoretical works on 
government. *
In neither his 1776 pamphlet Thoughts on Government 
nor his 1787-1788 book A Defence of the Constitutions of 
Government of the United States of America does Adams 
discuss the nature of republican diplomacy. However, 
republican ideology led Adams to view domestic and foreign
Robert E. Shalhope. "Republicanism and Early American 
Historiography," William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd Series, Vol. 
XXXIX, no. 2 (April, 1982). p.334-335.
2
3policy in the same light. If republican ideology taught 
Adams to fear the powers of his native government, it 
taught him to fear foreign powers even more. Adams 
concluded that the United States could not afford to help 
either France or Great Britain become the predominant power 
in the world. In actual operation, Adams's pursuit of a 
balance of power diplomacy looked like traditional British 
diplomacy. However, British diplomacy had no philosophical 
basis, and was based on practicality, not ideology. 2 
Adams arrived at a belief in a balance of power by viewing 
the world through a republican lens.
Adams was not as certain about American virtue as he 
was about the need for a balance of power. Adams veered 
between optimism about American virtue in 1775 and 1776 and 
a deep pessimism in the 1780s. During his first five years 
in Europe, Adams saw the Continental Congress as 
increasingly indecisive and subservient to France. Adams, 
like many Americans, considered the years 1775 and 1776 a 
golden age of virtue, and that whatever special virtue the 
Americans had was used up in the drive toward
• 7 . . .independence. Adams's fear of a decline in American 
virtue is evident in his letters home from Europe between
2David Bayne Horn. Great Britain and Europe in the Eight­
eenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 383. 
JEdmund S. Morgan. "The Puritan Ethic and the American 
Revolution,11 William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd Series, Vol. 
XXIV, no. 1 (January, 1967). p.19.
41778 and 1788. His Defence of the Constitutions is the 
fullest expression of his belief in the ability and the 
necessity of a balanced government to counteract the lack 
of virtue.
While in Europe, Adams faced the task of preserving 
the independence and potential for growth of a small power 
by playing two larger powers against each other. Adams 
hoped to use the United States's only real weapon, its 
trade, to lure France into the war by offering the French a 
chance to increase their power relative to Great Britain. 
Later, when a close connection with France threatened to 
suffocate the newborn United States, Adams again used 
American trade to force Great Britain to come to terms, 
lest the United States permanently cast its lot with the 
French. As a republican at home, Adams sought to preserve 
liberty through a balanced constitution. As a republican 
abroad, Adams sought to preserve American independence by 
balancing France against Great Britain, by making American 
trade too valuable for one power to let the other dominate 
it. Adams pursued a diplomacy that was traditionally 
British in operation, but republican in outlook.
PART I
A VIRTUOUS REPUBLIC
John Adams, like many Americans in the Revolutionary 
era, believed that America was set apart from other nations 
and had a special mission. "I always consider the 
settlement of America with Reverence and Wonder,” wrote 
Adams in an unused fragment from his 1765 pamphlet, A 
Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, "as the Opening 
of a grand scene and design in Providence, for the 
Illumination of the Ignorant and the Emancipation of the 
slavish Part of Mankind all over the Earth."4 This belief 
came in part from Adams' cyclical view of history, where 
one nation would rise, have its day as a great empire, and 
then give way to another nation. The center of power passed 
from Assyria to Egypt to Greece to Rome to France to 
England. America was the next step, as America was a young 
nation, just beginning its rise to power. Each new empire 
built on the previous one, and America would build her 
empire on British ruins. The American Revolution
4John Adams. Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. 4 vols. 
L.H. Butterfield, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1961), 1:257.
5
6marked the first step toward its goal.5 In this way, the 
American Revolution was an act of self-preservation: the
only way to preserve American power and virtue was to break
• • • 6away from a declining Great Britain.
How to preserve American liberty against all efforts 
at tyranny, both foreign and domestic, was the problem that 
faced John Adams throughout the American Revolution. Adams 
found his solution in the concept of balance. To prevent 
domestic attempts at tyranny, Adams advocated a 
constitution of separate branches, with power balanced 
among them. To prevent foreign encroachments on American 
liberty, Adams advocated American participation in the 
European balance of power, not by engaging in Europe's 
wars, but by making American independence too valuable to 
all European powers for any one power to threaten it.
Adams shared the Whig notion that the central question 
of politics was the distribution of power. Whig theory 
defined the minimum amount of power each man deserved as 
liberty. To maintain liberty, power must be dispersed as 
widely as possible, so that no one would receive more than 
his share.7 For Adams, power was the ability to control
5John R. Howe, Jr. The Changing Political Thought of John 
Adams (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 
36-44.
6Gordon S. Wood. The Creation of the American Republic. 1776- 
1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 
108.
'ibid, 21-22.
7others. Power was naturally aggressive and expansive, and 
gained at the expense of liberty and right.8 Adams, in A 
Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, described power 
as the "Desire of Dominion, that encroaching, grasping, 
restless and ungovernable Principle which has made so much 
Havock and Desolation.1,9 "Power naturally grows. Why?"
Adams wrote to Roger Sherman. "Because human passions are 
insatiable. But that power alone can grow which is already 
too great; that which is unchecked; that which has no equal 
to control it."10 This fear of unchecked power, and the 
historical examples of Julius Caesar and Oliver Cromwell, 
led to a fear of standing armies.11
A balanced republic could restrain power, but, Adams 
believed, a republic had to be founded on virtue.12 "The 
Preservation of Liberty depends upon the intellectual and 
moral Character of the People," Adams wrote in his notes 
for a speech in Braintree in 1772. "As long as Knowledge 
and Virtue are diffused generally among the Body of a 
Nation, it is impossible they should be enslaved."13
8Bernard Bailyn. The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 55-59.
°John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 1:255-256.
10John Adams to Roger Sherman, July 18, 1789, in John Adams, 
The Works of John Adams. 10 Vols. Charles Francis Adams, ed. 
/Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1850-1856), 6:431.
11Bailyn, Ideological Origins of American Revolution. 63. 
12Peter Shaw. The Character of John Adams (Chapel Hill: Univ­
ersity of North Carolina Press, 1976), 92.
13John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 2:58.
8People who remained virtuous and vigilant were able to 
balance the forces in society and maintain their liberty. 
Americans praised the British constitution for its ability 
to balance the forces of monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy, represented by the crown, lords and commons.14 
However, in the late-eighteenth century the British seemed 
to have lost their virtue. The degeneration of the British 
people allowed the crown to grow too powerful, and the 
crown in turn corrupted the House of Lords and House of 
Commons, destroying the balance of power.15 The republics 
of Greece and Rome had similarly grown corrupt and fallen 
in turn, as the loss of freedom quickly followed the loss 
of virtue.16 But were the Americans up to the task? Did 
they have enough virtue to maintain a republic? Adams 
always had doubts about American virtue, doubts that became 
more pronounced over time. However, in the 1770s, Adams 
believed the Americans were virtuous, or at least that the 
American Revolution would create virtue. "It may be the 
Will of Heaven that America shall suffer Calamaties still 
more wasting and Distresses yet more dreadfull," Adams 
wrote to his wife Abigail after Congress agreed to declare 
independence; "If this be the Case, it will have this good
14Bailyn, Ideological Origins of American Revolution. 65-77.
15Wood, Creation of the American Republic. 52.
16H. Trevor Colbourn. The Lamp of Experience (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 25.
9Effect, at least: it will inspire Us with many Virtues, 
which We have not, and correct many Errors, Follies, and 
Vices, which threaten to disturb, dishonour, and destroy 
Us."17
One reason the Americans had the capacity for virtue 
was that they were a young and agricultural people. Adams
sympathized with the French Physiocratic view that land
• . 1 8ownership was the basis of wealth. ° Adams preferred
agriculture even to New England's lifeblood, the fishing 
industry. Although Adams agreed the fisheries were a prime 
source of wealth, he wrote to Ralph Izard, "Agriculture is 
the most essential interest of America, and even of the 
Massachusetts Bay, and it is very possible to injure both, 
by diverting too much of the Thoughts and Labor of the 
People, from the cultivation of the Earth, to Adventures 
upon the Sea."19 Adams believed commerce tended to 
subvert virtue, and hence subvert republicanism. He wrote 
of the "Spirit of Commerce," to Mercy Otis Warren, arguing 
this spirit was, "incompatible with that purity of
17John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 3, 1776, in L.H. Butter­
field and Marc Friedlaender, eds. Adams Family Correspond­
ence . 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1963-1973), 2:28.
18Zoltan Haraszti. John Adams and the Prophets of Progress 
/Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 11.
John Adams to Ralph Izard, Sept. 25, 1778, in John Adams, 
Papers of John Adams. 8 vols. to date. Robert J. Taylor, et 
al, eds. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1977- .),7:73.
10
Heart, and Greatness of soul, which is necessary for a 
happy Republic•"2 0
Adams did have his doubts about American virtuousness. 
Through the study of moral philosophers, and his own 
observations, Adams saw that emotion often ruled over 
reason.21 Americans were not immune. "Virtue and 
Simplicity of Manners are indespensably necessary in a 
Republic, among all orders of Men," Adams wrote to Mercy 
Otis Warren, "But there is so much Rascallity, so much 
Venality and Corruption, so much Avarice and Ambition, such 
a rage for Profit and Commerce among all Ranks and Degrees 
of Men even in America, that I sometimes doubt whether 
there is public virtue enough to support a Republic."22 
However, the high ideals of the Revolution helped 
temporarily remove those doubts. "Human nature, with all 
its infirmities and deprevation, is capable of great 
things," he wrote Abigail, "it is capable of attaining to 
degrees of wisdom and of goodness, which we have reason to 
believe, appear respectable in the estimation of superior
, n ->
intelligences.J
Given that all men seek to acguire power, and that
20John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, April 16, 1776, in John 
Adams, Papers. 4:125
21Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 16-18.
22John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, Jan. 8, 1776, in John 
Adams, Papers, 3:398.
23John Adams to Abigail Adams, Oct. 29, 1775, in Butterfield 
and Friedlaender, eds. Adams Family Correspondence. 1:317.
11
even the most virtuous should not be trusted with unlimited 
power, a republic had to balance power and uphold the rule 
of law.24 To Adams, an example of such a repulic was the 
British constitution. Adams wrote in his "Novanglus" essays 
in early 1775 that the "republican spirit ... is a spirit 
of true virtue and independence. ... This spirit is so far 
from being incompatible with the British constitution, that 
it is the greatest glory of it, and the nation has always 
been most prosperous when it has most prevailed and been 
most encouraged by the crown."25 Adams concluded from 
this observation that, "the British constitution is much 
more like a republic than an empire. They [Aristotle, Livy 
and Harrington] define a republic to be a government of 
laws, and not of men. If this definition is just, the 
British constitution is nothing more or less than a 
republic, in which the king is nothing more than the first 
magistrate."2 6
The American Revolution did not intend to destroy 
society as it stood under the British constitution. Indeed, 
in the face of British decay, the Americans sought to 
preserve the British constitution, even if the British 
themselves chose to abandon it.27 The problem now facing
24Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 90-93.
25"Novanglus," Jan.-April, 1775, in John Adams, Papers, 2:278.
26"Novanglus," Jan.-April, 1775, in ibid. 2:314.
27Bailyn, Ideological Origins of American Revolution. 19.
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Adams and other American leaders was how to construct a 
government that could maintain a social order in the midst 
of a potentially socially disruptive event such as the 
American Revolution.28 Adams believed he found his answer 
in a balanced government, something of a purified British 
constitution. Adams wrote to Richard Henry Lee, "a 
Legislative, an Executive and a judicial Power, comprehend 
all of what is meant and understood by Government. It is by 
balancing each of these Powers against the other two, that 
the effort in human Nature towards Tyranny alone can be 
checked and restrained and any degree of Freedom preserved 
in the Constitution." Adams recommended that the lower 
house of the legislature be popularly elected, that the 
upper house, or council, should be chosen by the lower 
house, and that the governor should be chosen by both
O  Q
houses.
Adams expanded on these ideas in his first theoretical 
work, Thoughts on Government, which began as a letter to 
George Wythe and emerged as a pamphlet in April of
o n  . . .  .1776. Adams implied virtue was necessary to implement 
his model, writing that, "the noblest principles and most 
generous affections in our nature then, have the fairest
O  Q  , , ,
* Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 7-8.
29John Adams to Richard Henry Lee, Nov. 15, 1775, in John 
Adams, Papers, 3:307.
30"Thoughts on Government," editorial note, in John Adams, 
Papers, 4:65-66.
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chance to support the noblest and most generous models of 
government." Adams linked his ideas of the republican 
nature of the British constitution to his theory of 
government, and emphasized the rule of law. He wrote, "that 
form of government, which is best contrived to secure an 
impartial and exact execution of the laws, is the best of 
Republics."31
Adams' suspicion of human nature led him to advocate a 
bicameral legislature. "A single assembly is liable to all 
the vices, follies and frailties of an individual," wrote 
Adams, "subject to fits of humour, starts of passion, 
flights of enthusiasm, partialities of prejudice, and 
consequently productive of hasty results and absurd 
judgement." However, a properly balanced government could 
act as guarantor of virtue. Adams advocated laws for 
promoting education, and, to keep the spirit of luxury and 
commerce under control, sumptuary laws. "Frugality is a 
great revenue," wrote Adams, "besides curing us of 
vanities, levities, and fopperies which are antidotes to 
all great, manly and warlike virtues."32 A constitution, 
Adams concluded, could be a great inspiration to the 
people. A properly designed constitution could, "make the
31"Thoughts on Government," in ibid. 4:86-87.
32"Thoughts on Government," in ibid. 4:88, 91.
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common people brave and enterprizing. That ambition which 
is inspired by it makes them sober, industrious, and 
frugal."33
In 1779, between his two tours of duty in Europe,
Adams had the opportunity to design a government for 
Massachusetts. Adams' contributions to constitution-making 
included the division of the constitution into articles and 
sections.34 Adams, in the preamble, again emphasized the 
rule of law, writing that the constitution was to "provide 
for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an 
impartial interpretation; and a faithful execution of them, 
that every man, at all times, find his security in 
them."35 Adams included many of his ideas from "Thoughts 
on Government," such as a bicameral legislature, an 
independent judiciary, a strong executive, and, to 
encourage virtue, support for public education. °
The constitution of Massachusetts marked the most 
concrete of Adams' efforts to establish balanced 
government, and, like Adams' earlier works, reflects a fair 
amount of optimism about American virtue, with some 
safeguards to prevent, or at least mitigate, a decline in 
virtue. However, Adams' years abroad brought out more fully
33"Thoughts on Government," in ibid. 4:92.
3 Massachusetts Constitution, editorial note, in ibid. 8:231. 
3Massachusetts Constitution, in ibid. 8:237.
3Massachusetts Constitution, in ibid. 8:237-261.
his pessimism about American virtue. By the mid-1780' 
Adams changed some his perceptions about America, 
especially in regard to American virtue and American 
commercial activity.
PART II
A COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC
During John Adams's time in Europe, his views of 
America had changed, or rather, he believed that America 
itself had changed. By the 1780s Adams put his faith more 
in virtuous leaders than in the virtue of the American 
people. Adams concluded that the American people were not 
especially virtuous and could not escape the common fate of 
Europe.37 America's failure to overcome French influence
• ' J Om  foreign affairs was a result of the loss of virtue.
Adams held out little hope for a moral regeneration. "Moral 
Reflections, wise Maxims, religious Terrors, have little 
effect upon Nations when they contradict present Passion, 
Prejudice, Imagination, Enthusiasm or Caprice," Adams wrote 
to Thomas Jefferson; "I have long been settled in my own 
opinions, that neither Philosophy, nor Religion, nor 
Morality, nor Wisdom, nor Interest, will ever govern 
nations or Parties, against their Vanity, their Pride, 
their Resentment, or Revenge, or their Avarice or Ambition.
37Wood, Creation of the American Republic. 569-574.
38Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 130-131.
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Nothing but force and Power and Strength can restrain
oq , , ,
them.”'*17 If American society was not virtuous, Adams and 
other American leaders had to determine what American 
society was and how to organize a republic around it.
Adams, like other American thinkers, believed each 
society passed through four stages: hunting, pasturage, 
agriculture and commerce. Commercial society brought wealth 
and sophistication, but also brought luxury, which 
undermined virtue. Thomas Jefferson and his supporters 
believed that a republic could exist only at stage three. 
Jefferson believed that European nations turned to 
manufacturing and commerce only when they ran out of arable 
land. The United States had enough land to grow wealthy 
from agriculture, and therefore need not turn to 
manufacturing.40 Therefore, Jefferson preferred farming 
as a profession, almost to the total exclusion of 
manufacturing and shipping. In his famous Notes on the 
State of Virginia. Jefferson wrote that, "those who labor 
in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a 
chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar 
deposit for substantial and genuine virtue." Manufacturing 
had no place in Jefferson's America, and he preferred to
O Q  ,
J^John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 9, 1787, m  Lester J. 
Cappon, ed. The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill: Univers­
ity of North Carolina Press, 1988), 202-203.
40Drew R. McCoy. The Elusive Republic (Chapel Hill: Univers­
ity of North Carolina Press, 1980), 10, 14, 19-22.
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"let our work-shops remain in Europe."41 Jefferson did 
favor commerce, but to Jefferson "commerce" meant 
transporting American agricultural products to Europe. How 
they got there was of little importance, and Jefferson 
seems to have wanted Europeans rather than Americans to do 
the carrying. Jefferson wrote to John Jay that Americans 
should be farmers, and while there was land to till, "I 
would not convert them into mariners." Further, Jefferson 
argued, if Americans engaged in the carrying trade, the 
United States would be dragged into Europe's wars.
Jefferson preferred that "foreign nations ... be invited to 
bring us what we want and to take our productions in their 
own bottoms."42 On the other end of the spectrum,
Alexander Hamilton wanted the United States to move into 
stage four, the commercial and manufacturing stage.
Hamilton foresaw a great nation based on industrial and 
financial power rather than agrarian virtue. Unlike 
Jefferson, Hamilton rejected the model of the classical 
republic.43
John Adams can be seen something of a transitional 
figure in this debate. Adams might have railed against the
4Thomas Jefferson. Notes on the State of Virginia (1787). 
William Peden, ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carol­
ina Press, 1955), 164-165.
42Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, Aug. 23, 1785, in Thomas 
Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Vol. 8. Julian 
Boyd, ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1953), 426-427.
3McCoy, Elusive Republic. 132-134.
19
“spirit of commerce” in his early writings, but he sought 
to control its effects, not eliminate commerce. Adams might 
have sypmpathized with Jefferson's agrarianism as an ideal, 
but he believed that America was already a commercial 
nation.44 "Our Country is grown," Adams lamented to 
Cotton Tufts.45 The American character could not have 
changed so drastically between the 1770s and 1780s, and 
Adams concluded, like Hamilton, that the Americans had 
never been or would ever be fit for Samuel Adams'
"Christian Sparta." America would probably be better off as 
a result.46 "It is most certain that our Countrymen are 
not and never were, Spartans in their Contempt of Wealth, 
and I will go farther and say they ought not to be," Adams 
wrote to James Warren, "Such a trait in their Character 
would render them lazy Drones unfit for the Agriculture, 
Manufactures, Fisheries, and Commerce, and Population of 
the ir Country."4 7
Adams believed a healthy American economy depended on 
agriculture, shipping, and manufactures. Unlike Jefferson, 
who wanted to depend on foreigners for the last two,
44Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 133-134.
45John Adams to Cotton Tufts, July 4, 1786, Adams Family 
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Letterbook, reel
H 3*McCoy, Elusive Republic. 71-72, 97.
47John Adams to James Warren, July 4, 1786, in Warren-Adams 
Letters. 2 vols. (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 
Collections. LXXII-LXXIII, 1917-1925), 2:277.
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Adams believed that the American economy should, as much as 
possible, be controlled by Americans. "I wish We were wise 
enough,” Adams wrote to Cotton Tufts,” to depend on 
ourselves for every Thing, and upon them [Europeans] for 
nothing."48 While Adams portrayed America as an 
agricultural nation to the Count de Vergennes, he also 
cited American interest in shipping, if, "only to carry the
. d Qproduce of their lands ... to the European market."*1*
In his economic thought, Adams was no doubt influenced 
by the economic situation of New England in the eighteenth 
century. "My Practice as a Barrister in the Counties of 
Essex, Plymouth and Barnstable," Adams wrote in his 
autobiography, "had introduced me to more Knowledge both of 
the Cod and whale fisheries and their importance to the 
commerce and Naval Power of this Country than any other man 
possessed.1,50 Adams's statement reflects the importance 
of fishing to New England. Not only did the fisheries give 
New England a "crop" for export, but by transporting fish 
in their own boats, New Englanders cut their trade deficit 
with Great Britain. Lack of agricultural products led New 
Englanders to develop America's first service industry, the
48John Adams to Cotton Tufts, Dec. 9, 1780, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reel 102.
49John Adams to the Count de Vergennes, quoted in Charles 
Francis Adams. The Life of John Adams. 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippencott and Co., 1871), 1:460.
50John Adams, Diary and Autobiaraohv. 4:5.
21
carrying trade, providing ships and cargo space for others. 
New Englanders engaged in fanning and manufacturing to meet 
their immediate needs and made their money off the carrying 
trade.51 For Adams, the diverse New England economy 
reflected the future American economy. He wrote Rufus King, 
"Agriculture, Manufactures and Commerce with one another 
will make us flourish."
This statement is not to suggest that Adams shaped his 
republican beliefs around New England's economic interests. 
The advanced state of New England's economy gave Adams a 
perspective Jefferson did not have. Jefferson could look 
out his window and see the uncultivated land needed to keep 
America an agricultural republic and the corrupting 
influence of commerce away. Adams saw commerce already 
well-established and could, with less trouble, picture a 
commercial republic. If commercialism undermined virtue, 
Americans had to construct what Gordon Wood calls, "a new 
and original sort of republican government," one that did 
not depend on virtue for its success.53
In many ways Adams's three-volume work, A Defence of 
the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
51John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard. The Economy of 
British America 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1985), 72, 92, 100, 110.
5 John Adams to Rufus King, June 14, 1786, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reel 113.
Wood, Creation of the American Republic. 475.
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America, published in 1787-1788, is an attempt to come to 
terms with the idea of a non-virtuous republic. Adams wrote 
the Defence in response to the French philospher Turgot, 
who criticized the United States for following British 
forms too closely.54 Adams responded by praising the 
British constitution, writing, "I only contend that the 
British constitution is, in theory ... the most stupendous 
fabric of human invention; and that the Americans ought to 
be applauded instead of censured, for imitating it as far 
as they have done.”55
J.G.A. Pocock calls Adams's Defence of the 
Constitutions the last major work of classical 
republicanism.56 However, in the first passages, Adams 
noted the differences between the classical and modern 
worlds. "The inventions in mechanic arts, the discoveries 
in natural philosophy, navigation, and commerce, and the 
advancement of civilization and humanity," Adams wrote, 
"have occasioned changes in the condition of the world, 
which would have astonished the most refined nations of 
antiquity."57 The most recent change, and probably among 
the most urgent to Adams, was the increase of wealth and 
commerce in the United States. Such a change would have
54Howe, Changing Political Thought of John Adams. 166. 
55"Defence," vol. 1, in John Adams, Works. 4:358.
J.G.A. Pocock. The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), 526.
57"Defence," vol 1, in John Adams, Works. 4:283.
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ruined a classical republic, but Adams believed that a 
balanced constitution could offset the effects of commerce 
in a modern republic. "In the late war, the Americans found 
an unusual quantity of money flow in upon them, without the 
least degree of prudence, foresight, consideration, or 
measure, rushed headlong into a greater degree of luxury 
than ought to have crept in for a hundred years," Adams 
wrote, "... In a country like America, where means and 
opportunities for luxury are so easy and so plenty, it 
would be madness not to expect it, be prepared for it, and 
provide against the dangers of it in the constitution."58
Adams again portrayed a balanced government as 
guarantor of liberty. In Defence of the Constitutions, 
balance took on the tone of protecting the few and the many 
against each other. In a single assembly, commoner and 
noble would battle for power and destroy liberty. "Whether 
the assembly consists of a larger or smaller number of 
nobles or commons, of great people or little, of rich or 
poor, of substantial men or the rabble, the effects are all 
the same," Adams wrote, "No order, no safety, no liberty.
C Q  ,
because no government of law."^17 Adams again gave England 
as the best example of such a balanced government, writing,
58"Defence," vol. 3, in ibid. 6:96.
59"Defence," vol. 2, in ibid, 5:288-289.
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"we have seen one of the first nations in Europe ... which 
has still preserved the power of the people by the 
equilibrium we are contending for, by the trial by jury, 
and by constantly refusing a standing army.60
Unlike James Madison, Adams does not seem to have 
given much consideration to the amount of territory needed 
to maintain a balanced government. Madison, in the tenth 
Federalist, argued that a republic needed to be physically 
large to multiply and diffuse factions. "Extend the 
sphere," Madison wrote, "and you take in a greater variety 
of parties and interests."61 Adams sought to control 
parties within a balanced government. Adams, when 
discussing medieval Florence, blamed the fall of the 
Florentine republic on its unicameral legislature rather 
than its small size.62
Adams had always hoped for a republic based on virtue. 
In Defence of the Constitutions. Adams argued that balance 
might compensate for the lack of virtue. "The best 
republics will be virtuous, and have been so; but we may 
hazard a conjecture, that the virtues have been the effects 
of a well-ordered constitution, rather than the cause,"
Adams wrote, "and perhaps it would be impossible to prove
60"Defence," vol. 1, in ibid, 4:381-382.
61Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. The 
Federalist. Jacob E. Cooke, ed. (Middletowm, Conn.: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1961), 64.
"Defence," vol. 2, in John Adams, Works. 5:22.
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that a republic cannot exist even among highwaymen, by 
setting one rogue to watch another: and the knaves 
themselves may be made honest by the struggle.” J This 
represented Adams's final break with the classical world, 
that virtue was not necessary to start a republic. Adams 
believed virtue was still possible, but would not risk a 
government on it.
Adams' diplomatic career during the American 
Revolution reflects both the optimistic and pessimistic 
trends in his political philosophy. Because America was a 
young nation, Adams believed it should avoid the corruption 
of a European alliance. Even if American society was not as 
virtuous as Adams previously believed, Adams feared a 
foreign alliance would harm America by dragging it into 
European wars. Because Adams regarded America as a 
commercial nation, he sought to expand trade through the 
Model Treaty, protect the carrying trade by appealing to 
the Armed Neutrality, and protect American rights to the 
fisheries. Because Adams believed in the rule of law, he 
accepted the French alliance, and because Adams believed 
that leaders should be virtuous, he objected to Franklin's 
personal style of diplomacy. Above all, Adams believed that
63"Defence,” vol. 3, in ibid. 6:219.
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American independence, like American liberty, could be 
preserved through a balance of power.
PART III
THE DIPLOMACY OF A SHORT WAR 
1775-1776
John Adams believed in a balance of power in both 
government and international relations. Balance of power 
diplomacy fit into his conception that, as a force hostile 
to freedom, power had to be checked for freedom to survive. 
In the international arena, the unchecked power of one 
nation could threaten the freedom of others. Although 
Americans could create constitutions that balanced 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers at home,
America could not as easily balance the power of Great 
Britain. Adams was certain that America would one day be as 
powerful as Great Britain, and his belief in America as a 
rising empire influenced his ideas of diplomacy. According 
to legend, the Pilgrims carved the phrase, "The eastern 
nations sink, their glory ends/ An empire rises where the 
sun descends," on Plymouth Rock. Adams believed the phrase, 
if not the legend. Adams had accepted Benjamin Franklin's
27
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theory that the American population would double every 20 
years.64 Adams wrote in 1755, "if we can remove the 
turbulent Gallicks, our People according to the exactest 
Computations, will in another Century, become more numerous 
than England itself. Should this be the Case, since we have 
(I may say) all the naval stores of the Nation in our hands
it will be easy to obtain mastery of the seas, and than the
united force of all Europe will not be able to subdue
us."65 When the Britons became turbulent in 1775 and
1776, the Continental Congress faced the problem of how to 
shepherd this growing, but still weak, nation through the 
American Revolution without being destroyed by Great 
Britain. To Adams, in 1775 and 1776, the answer lay in 
creating a balance of power on the North American continent 
by conquering Canada, and a balance in diplomacy by using 
American commerce.
Adams fully supported the 1775 American invasion of 
Canada, writing in his autobiography that he was "wholly 
occupied" by its conduct. ° Congress, m  planning the 
invasion, had the dual political agenda of presenting a
f.A ,
James H. Hutson. John Adams and the Diplomacy of the 
American Revolution (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
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united front against Great Britain and appealing to the 
Canadians as fellow Americans suffering from British 
oppression.67 Adams probably believed that strategic 
reasons for taking Canada were more important. France had 
used Canada as a base from which to attack British 
settlements. The Americans could expect the same from the 
British. "In the Hands of our Enemies, it [Canada] would 
enable them [the British] to influence all the Indians upon 
the Continent to take up the Hatchet," Adams wrote to James 
Warren, "and commit their Robberies and Murder upon the 
Frontiers of all the Southern Colonies as well as pour down 
Regulars Canadian and Indians together upon the Borders of 
the Northern."68
Two different, and uncoordinated, American forces 
attacked Canada. In July of 1775, Congress ordered General 
Philip Schuyler to invest Fort Ticonderoga, and from there 
moved up the Richelieu River to Montreal. Schuyler remained 
at Ticonderoga until General Richard Montgomery advanced to 
Lake Champlain in September. George Washington, on his own 
accord, sent a force under Colonel Benedict Arnold from
eg
Cambridge, through Maine, to Canada. *
The Americans were initially successful. Montgomery
67Don Higginbotham. The War of American Independence (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 108.
68John Adams to James Warren, Feb. 18, 1776, in John Adams, 
Papers, 4:28.
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lay seige to St. Johns in October, and took the fort after 
55 days. General Sir Guy Carleton retreated before 
Montgomery's advancing force, and Montgomery took Montreal 
in November. Montgomery, upon learning that Arnold had 
reached Canada, left a garrison at Montreal and took 375 
men to meet Arnold. Montgomery joined Arnold's 675 men on 
December 2, at Point aux Trembles, 20 miles from 
Quebec.70
The Americans did not have enough supplies to lay 
seige to Quebec and had to attack before Arnold's troops, 
whose enlistments were up on December 31, left. The 
Americans attacked on the snowy night of December 30. The 
attack failed, and Montgomery was killed.71
In February 1776, Adams proposed a commission be sent 
to Canada. Congress selected Benjamin Franklin, Samuel 
Chase of Maryland, who supported the invasion of Canada, 
and two Catholics, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a member 
of the Maryland safety committee, and John Carroll, a 
Jesuit priest.72 In the instructions to the
commissioners, dated March 20, 1776, Adams took great pains 
to show that French Catholics would be welcome in a union 
with American Protestants. "You are to ... declare, that we
70 ibid. 111-112.
71ibid. 112-114.
72Thomas O'Brien Hanley. Revolutionary Statesman; Charles 
Carroll and the War (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1983), 
101-103, 109.
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hold sacred the rights of conscience," Adams wrote, "and 
may promise the whole people, solemnly in our name, the 
free and unfettered exercise of their religion; and, to 
theclergy, the full, perfect, and peaceable possession and 
enjoyment of all their estates."73
Upon reaching Canada, the commissioners realized their 
political mission was as hopeless as the military effort 
had become. Franklin noted that the French Catholics were 
hostile to America, and that at least half of the few 
Canadian Protestants were Loyalists. Franklin saw no reason 
to continue the mission and left Canada on May ll.74 
Before he left, the commisioners reported to President John 
Hancock that, if Congress had no hard money for the 
Canadian campaign, "it would be advisable, in our opinion, 
to withdraw our army and fortify the passes on the lakes to 
prevent the enemy, and the Canadians, if so inclined, from 
making irruptions into and depredations on our 
frontiers."75 Charles Carroll wrote in his journal of the 
"bad prospect of our affairs in Canada."76 Congress
73Instructions to the Commissioners to Canada, March 20,
1776, in John Adams, Papers, 4:8.
74Carl Van Doren. Beniamin Franklin (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1938), 546.
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learned of the failure of the Canadian mission in June. 
Adams blamed the loss of Canada on congressional 
indecision, lack of information regarding the political 
situation in Canada, lack of a competent general after 
Montgomery's death, and a general lack of supplies, money, 
men, and medicine.77
As the Canadian debacle demonstrated, America could 
not defeat Great Britain completely on her own. America 
needed an ally, and the logical choice was France. However, 
the need for a foreign alliance created two problems. The 
first was whether an alliance should precede or follow 
formal independence. America was already acting like an 
independent nation. Would a formal declaration do any good, 
especially in view of the fact that America had no
. 7ft » .alliances?'0 Radicals like Samuel Adams urged Congress to 
charge forward. "Is not America already independent?" he 
wrote to Samuel Cooper; "Why then not declare it?"79 
Members opposed to independence feared that by cutting its 
last link to Great Britain, America would be at the mercy
77John Adams to Samuel Cooper? June 9, 1776, in John Adams, 
Papers, 4:242-243.
78Jack N. Rakove. The Beginnings of National Politics (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 89.
79Samuel Adams to Samuel Cooper, April 3, 1776, in Paul H. 
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vols. to date (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress,
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of foreign powers, "When We have bound ourselves to an 
eternal Quarrel with G.B. by a Declaration of 
Independence," John Dickinson said in his July 1, 1776, 
speech against independence, "France has nothing to do but 
hold back and intimidate G.B. till Canada is put into her 
Hands, then to intimidate Us into a most disadvantageous 
Grant of our Trade."80 John Adams argued that, instead of 
needing a foreign alliance in order to declare 
independence, America needed formal independence before 
anynation would sign an alliance. "[F]oreign powers could 
not be expected to acknowledge Us," Adams wrote, "till We 
had acknowledged ourselves and taken our Station, among 
them as a sovereign Power, and Independent Nation."OJ- 
Adams dismissed Dickinson's fears of French domination, 
because America did not seek a political or military 
alliance. "I wish for nothing but Commerce," Adams 
wrote.8 2
The second problem with a foreign alliance, more 
specifically a French alliance, was the question of the 
nature of such an alliance. Adams believed America should 
offer only a commercial treaty. Adams thought France, out 
of a desire to gain at British expense, would enter the war
80John Dickinson's speech notes, July 1, 1776, in ibid. 
4:354.
81John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 3:327.
82John Adams to John Winthrop, June 23, 1776, in John 
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without a formal military alliance. Besides, a political or 
military treaty might upset the international balance of
0 0  . . .  .p o w e r . I t  was not m  America's interest, Adams wrote m  
his autobiography, to enter into any European war, either 
to ally with France to destroy Great Britain, or to ally 
with Great Britain to destroy France. Americans learned 
after 1763 that freedom was in danger if any one nation
O  A
became too powerful. * In March of 1776, Adams argued m  
Congress, "is any Assistance attainable from F[ranee]? What 
Connection may We safely form with her? 1st. No Political 
Connection. Submit to none of her Authority —  receive no 
Governors, or Officers from her. 2d. No military 
Connection. Receive no Troops from her. 3d. Only a 
Commercial Connection."85
Adams believed that American commerce would create a 
balance between Great Britain and France that would allow 
the United States to remain independent. All European 
nations would want American trade, as Thomas Paine put it, 
"while eating is the custom of Europe."86 Adams wanted to 
break the British monopoly on American commerce, opening 
markets to France and other countries, as well as Great 
Britain. Both Great Britain and France would benefit from
88Shaw, Character of John Adams. 281-282.
8^John Adams, Diary and Autobiography. 3:329.
85ibid, 2:236.
86Thomas Paine. Common Sense (1776), (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1987), 83.
35
American commerce, and neither of them would attack the
• • • 87United States, for fear of retribution from the other.
Congress placed John Adams in charge of a committee to 
draft a treaty of alliance that would serve as the model 
for American treaties with European powers. The treaty 
became known as the Model Treaty. On September 17, 1776, 
Adams presented his draft of the Model Treaty. Adams, in
writing the treaty, was influenced by the Treaty of
88 . Utrecht.00 The 1713 Anglo-French Treaty of Utrecht, which
ended the War of the Spanish Succession, gave mutual
most-favored-nation status and established free navigation
• • • • 8Qm  the signatories' European possessions.3 The Model 
Treaty's 30 articles guaranteed reciprocal trade, 
protection for each nation's ships in the other's ports, 
and a narrow definition of contraband —  excluding food and 
ships' stores —  that emphasized the principle of "free 
ships, free goods.” The only military concessions were that 
the United States would remain neutral (rather than ally 
with Great Britain) if Great Britain declared war on France 
as a result of the treaty, and that the United States would 
not make a separate peace with Great Britain. Furthermore, 
the treaty barred France from taking any British colonies
87 • .°'Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 28-31. 
°°Model Treaty, editorial note, in John Adams, Papers. 
4:263.
89Max Savelle. The Origins of American Diplomacy (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1967), 150-151.
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• • QO . . . . .in North America. u Congress did permit some flexibility 
in presenting the treaty to France. On September 24, 
President Hancock informed the American commisioners in 
Paris that the article guaranteeing the safety of American 
ships in French harbors should be insisted upon. However, 
clauses relating to protection from the Barbary pirates and 
West Indian duties were not to hold up progress on signing 
the treaty. If asked to, the American envoys were allowed 
to give a more elaborate and explicit pledge not to ally 
with Great Britain if Great Britain declared war as a 
result of the treaty.91
American diplomacy to 1776 seems to have been based on 
the presumption that the revolution would be a short war.
If America took Canada, Great Britain would have no 
foothold in North America and presumably would have to give 
in to American demands. It is possible that Congress 
believed that, when faced with the loss of American trade 
and the threat of French intervention, Great Britain would 
back down, preferring peace with an independent United 
States to war with both America and France. The Committee 
of Secret Correspondence wrote to the American 
commissioners in Paris that many believed, "the war might
Q 0 ,
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soon be concluded, so were our military arrangements 
accommodated."92 However, the war was going badly. The 
Americans, as already seen, failed to take Canada. The 
British army, under General Sir William Howe, captured New 
York City, marched in triumph through New Jersey, and 
established winter quarters outside of Philadelphia.
• Q  “ICongress fled to Baltimore. J Congress backed away from 
the Model Treaty. On December 30, the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence ordered the American commissioners to do 
whatever was needed to bring France or any other European
, , , q a .
nation into the war as soon as possible. * Despite John 
Adams's hopes and efforts, the United States could not win 
its independence without a military alliance. The question 
for Adams became less how to avoid plunging into European 
politics, and more how to plunge in without drowning 
American freedom.
go , ,
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PART IV
JOHN ADAMS IN PARIS 
1777-1779
The American envoys at Paris and John Adams moved at 
different paces toward the realization that the United 
States had to offer more than a commercial treaty to get 
France to enter the war. The Americans in Paris, Benjamin 
Franklin, Arthur Lee of Virginia, and Silas Deane of 
Connecticut, took the initiative in offering a closer 
connection. The Comte de Vergennes, the French foreign 
minister, saw the trap John Adams had laid for him.
Vergennes knew that the United States wanted to deflect the 
war from the United States to Europe. If Adams intended to 
use France to secure American independence, Vergennes 
intended to use the United States to increase French power 
relative to Great Britain. To do this, Vergennes needed 
greater assurances that America would continue to
, Q C  , ,
fight. J The American commissioners moved to reassure
Q C  ,
Gerald Stourzh. Beniamin Franklin and American Foreign 
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 136-140.
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Vergennes. In March 1777, they proposed that France and the 
United States share the Canadian fisheries, that France 
help the United States conquer continental British 
possessions in exchange for American help against the 
British West Indies, and that the United States declare war 
on British-allied Portugal if Spain entered the war on the 
American side.96 John Adams held out against a close 
connection with France. ”1 have very often been ashamed to 
hear so many Whiggs groaning and sighing with Despondency, 
and whining out their Fears that We must be subdued unless 
France shold step in,” Adams wrote in disgust to James 
Warren, "Are We to be beholden to France for our 
Liberties?"97
On November 7, 1777, Congress appointed John Adams to 
replace Silas Deane as a commissioner to France. Adams set 
sail on February 13, 1778.98 Adams's mission accomplished 
nothing in terms of actual policy. However, the mission 
plunged Adams into personal and policy disputes that helped 
shape his view and system of diplomacy.
According to Charles Francis Adams, John Adams 
accepted the appointment to France, at the urging of 
congressional allies such as Henry Laurens, Richard Henry
96The American Commissioners to Vergennes, March 14, 1777, 
in Franklin, Papers. 23:504-505.
97John Adams to James Warren, May 3, 1777, in John Adams, 
Papers. 5:174.
98Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 33-34.
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Lee and James Lovell, in order to carry out his ideas of a
• , goproper foreign policy. * Adams would not get that 
chance.He arrived at Bordeaux on April 1, 1778, only to 
find that Franklin, Lee, and Deane had signed commercial 
and military treaties with France on February 6, 
accomplishing the goal of Adams7 mission.100 Despite 
earlier misgivings, Adams came to support the military 
treaty. As long as Great Britain held territory in North 
America, the United States needed French support.101 "We 
... have the surest Ground to expect the Jealousy and 
Hatred of Great Britain," Adams wrote to Samuel Adams, 
"[therefore] We have the Strongest Reasons to depend upon 
the Friendship and Alliance of France."102
Just as important, the treaties, once signed, held the 
force of American and international law. If the United 
States did not fulfill its obligations under the law, it 
could expect no further help from Europe. "This faith [in 
upholding the treaty] is our American Glory, and it is our 
Bulwark," Adams wrote to James Warren, "it is the only 
Foundation on which our Union can rest securely, it is the 
only Support of our Credit both in Finance and Commerce, it 
is our sole Security for the Assistance of Foreign
qq
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powers.”103 Adams believed French support was solid, 
informing Samuel Adams that, "Every suspicion of a 
waveringdisposition in this court concerning the support of 
America is groundless."104
Adams came to disapprove of the conduct of two of his 
collegues, Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin. Before Adams 
arrived, Arthur Lee accused Silas Deane of mixing his 
personal finances with those of the embassy. Franklin 
generally backed Deane against Lee. Adams arrived in France 
neutral toward Deane, and generally favorable toward 
Franklin and Arthur Lee, and hoping to keep out of 
conflicts within the commission.105 Adams soon became 
involved in the aftermath of the Silas Deane affair. Deane 
had left Paris before Adams arrived. Congress recalled 
Deane on August 5, 1777, because Deane had granted too many 
commissions to non-English-speaking French officers. Soon 
Congress learned that Deane had used his position to 
further his private commercial interests. Arthur Lee, 
who had clashed with Deane in Paris, wrote to Congress
103John Adams to James Warren, August 4, 1778, in ibid. 
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accusing Deane of corruption.107 Deane counterattacked at 
his first opportunity. He wrote an "Address to the Free and 
Virtuous Citizens of America," published in the 
Pennsylvania Packet on December 5, 1778. In this address, 
Deane accused the Lee family in general and Arthur Lee in 
particular of treason and disloyalty to the Franco-American 
alliance. The story reached Paris in February of 1779. John 
Adams was outraged at Deane's behavior, and Deane's attacks 
on Adams' allies, the Lees.108 "That there appeared to me 
no Alternative left but the Ruin of Mr. Deane, or the Ruin 
of his Country," Adams wrote in his diary, "That he 
appeared to me in the Light of a wild Boar, that ought to 
be hunted down for the Benefit of Mankind."109
Adams came into conflict with Franklin as well. Adams, 
the stern New Englander, disapproved of Franklin's 
hedonistic lifestyle.110 Adams also resented the 
attention Franklin received in Paris. Adams believed that 
the image of the "backwoods philosopher" Franklin 
cultivated was fraudulent and that he had a better claim to
1 r j 7  , , .'Louis W. Potts. Arthur Lee: A Virtuous Revolutionary 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 
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the title than the worldly Doctor Franklin.111 More 
important, Adams and Franklin clashed over policy. Just as 
Adams called for a government of laws and not men, he 
advocated a diplomacy based on interests and not diplomats. 
Interest was the firm basis for a long-term policy.112 
Franklin based his diplomacy on his personal relationship 
with the French. Franklin overflowed with gratitude toward 
France for its generous help in public displays that Adams 
found distateful. Franklin played on Louis XVI's ego rather 
than French interest alone.11** Here is the beginning of 
two conflicting systems of diplomacy; long-range, 
interest-based diplomacy and short-range, personality-based 
diplomacy.
Despite his feelings toward Franklin, Adams believed 
that it would do more harm than good to remove the doctor. 
"Yet such is his fame on both sides of the water," Adams 
wrote to Thomas McKean, "that it is best, perhaps, that he 
should be left there [in France]."114 Congress did just 
that on September 14, 1778, reorganizing the diplomatic 
corps and making Franklin sole minister in Paris. Adams 
received the news on February 12, 1779. After several 
months of trying to leave, Adams sailed for America on June
ij-^Shaw, Character of John Adams. 118.
112Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 11. 
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17, 1779, arriving at Boston on August 2.115
Sitting on the docks at Nantes, waiting for a ship 
home, John Adams had time to draw some disturbing 
conclusions about his tour in France, Silas Deane had 
returned home and denounced Adams's allies, the Lees. 
Congress made Deane's ally, Franklin, sole minister to 
France and left Adams without a job, or even a formal 
letter of recall. Adams concluded that Franklin was the 
agent of his destruction.116 And was it a coincidence 
that Franklin was the French favorite? Adams took his 
suspicions home to America. When he returned to Europe, 
Adams believed it was his mission to guard American 
independence, against both its allies and its enemies.
115Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 41,
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PART V
ALLIES AND ENEMIES 
1779-1782
John Adams spent the summer and early fall of 1779 
writing the constitution of Massachusetts. When he returned 
to Europe in late 1779 he pursued an agenda dictated more 
by his beliefs and experiences than by Congress. Over the 
next three years, Adams broadly construed his powers as 
peace commissioner so as to include any actions needed to 
force Great Britain to negotiate. Adams sought to base 
American diplomacy on American interest, and he defined 
American interests as persuading the French to provide 
naval cover and tying as many nations as possible to the 
American cause. In this way, Adams tried to defend American 
independence against all threats, whether concealed or 
open, whether from allies or enemies.
As many Americans feared, John Adams included, the 
French alliance dragged the United States further into 
European politics. In January 1779, Congress reaffirmed the
45
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provisions of the 1778 treaty forbidding either side from 
making a separate peace with Great Britain.117 America 
had already made concessions to get France into the war. 
Spain was the next diplomatic target. Conrad Alexandre 
Gerard, the French minister to the United States, tried to 
make American demands acceptable to Spain. The recall of 
Silas Deane helped further French influence. Gerard 
personally supported the pro-Deane moderates against the 
pro-Lee radicals, and used his influence to whittle down
• 110American peace demands.
The United States began with a fairly ambitious list 
of peace demands. On February 23, 1779, the congressional 
committee created to draft the peace ultimata recommended 
that the United States demand absolute independence, 
control of territory to the Mississippi River, British 
evacuation of American territory, American rights to the 
Newfoundland fisheries, free navigation of the Mississippi, 
free commerce on the Mississippi below the American 
boundary, and either the cession or independence of Nova 
Scotia. Gerard tried to moderate these demands to make them 
more acceptable to Great Britain and less threatening to 
Spain, which entered the war as a French (but not American)
117 • ,'Resolution of Congress, January 14, 1779, in Wharton,
ed. Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence. 3:23.
lT8Rakove, Beginnings of National Politics. 255-256.
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ally on April 12, 1779.119 Gerard used his influence to 
have Congress drop its demand for the fisheries. ^
Congress complied. On August 14, 1779, Congress made 
absolute independence and control of territory west to the 
Mississippi and south to 31* north latitude its demands.
. . . . 1 9 1The fisheries were not to hold up peace negotiations.
Gerard also pushed for John Jay to be elected peace 
commissioner and replace Arthur Lee as minister to Spain. 
Gerard achieved only partial victory. In September of 1779, 
radicals in Congress led by Samuel Adams and the rest of 
the Massachusetts delegation, opposed Jay's nomination. The 
radicals, having lost the fisheries as a peace ultimatim, 
sought to elect John Adams, who, despite the decision, 
would seek American rights to the fisheries in any 
negotiations. Congress was deadlocked until the radicals 
and moderates agreed to divide the positions of peace 
commissioner and minister to Spain. Congressional radicals 
abandoned Arthur Lee, and Congress elected Adams peace 
commissioner and Jay minister to Spain on September
1 1 Q ,
Richard B. Morris. The Peacemakers (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1965), 15-18.
William C. Stinchcombe. The American Revolution and the 
French Alliance (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969),
fiiJ-*-LJournals of the Continental Congress. 14:956-960.
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Adams learned of his appointment, much to his 
surprise, in October. Elbridge Gerry urged him to accept, 
and Adams agreed that the commission was too important to 
turn down. However, Adams believed Franklin would attempt 
to frustrate his mission, and asked that Congress order 
Franklin to authorize payments to him. Adams sailed for 
Europe on November 13, 1779. En route, the ship began
.  t  1 o 1leaking and put m  at El Ferrol, Spain, on December 8. * 
Neither Vergennes nor John Adams looked forward to 
seeing each other again. In the summer of 1779, Gerard 
reported to Vergennes that John Adams, Samuel Adams and 
Richard Henry Lee were part of a pro-British faction. Adams 
and Vergennes therefore clashed on first contact over 
whether or not to inform London of Adams's powers to treat 
for peace. Adams's insistence on telling the British of his 
commission served to convince Vergennes that Adams was, 
after all, pro-British.124 Adams hoped to determine 
British intentions and believed that revealing his 
commission, ‘'would . . . draw out from them some proofs of 
their present designs, and it is always important to 
discover early the intention of the enemy."125 Vergennes 
believed such a move premature. Great Britain had made no
1 O') , , t
■■^ ''Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 51-55. 
124ibid. 56-59.
125John Adams to Vergennes, July 17, 1780, in John Adams, 
Works. 7:228-229.
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peace overtures, and offering peace and commerce would only 
convince the British that America would cave in to British 
demands.126
Adams differed with Vergennes over military strategy 
as well as negotiating strategy. Many Americans believed 
that America needed only French sea power to defeat Great
• • 197 iBritain. Adams tended to agree. f,A Navy is our 
natural, and our only adequate defense,” Adams wrote to 
Samuel Huntington, president of the Continental 
C o n g r ess.However, Spain and France concentrated on 
British rather than American waters. A Franco-Spanish fleet 
attempted to invade Great Britain. The allied fleet did not 
join until July 22, 1779, and because of further delays and 
shipboard illness, it allowed the British fleet to escape 
to Portsmouth on August 31. The Franco-Spanish fleet 
retreated from the English Channel on September 8.129
Adams believed these vast forces might be more 
profitably deployed in American waters. He reported to 
Huntington in March 1780 on the strength of the French
126Observations on Mr. J. Adams letter of July 17, 1780, in 
Wharton, ed. Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence. 4:3-6. 
127Stinchcombe, American Revolution and French Alliance.
151.
12 John Adams to Samuel Huntington, October 14, 1780, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 101.
129Jonathan R. Dull. The French Navv and American 
Independence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1975), 154-157.
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fleet, writing, "one would think that there was force 
enough in them to protect Us and quiet all our Fears but 
the Battle is not always to the strong and we must wait for 
Time to decide Events."130 Adams criticized allied naval 
action in Europe, especially after he learned of Admiral 
Rodney's January 16, 1780, victory over the Spanish at 
Gibraltar.131 Adams complained that vast fleets were 
wasted on Gibraltar, "which is but a Trifle," while even a 
smaller French fleet would triumph off America.132 Adams 
spent much of his time in Paris pelting Vergennes with 
advice on naval policy. In a letter of July 13, Adams 
warned that some in the United States were still suspicious 
of the French. A show of naval force in American waters 
would reassure the country, and could force the British out
• • • • * 1 3  3of Philadelphia and isolate them in New York City. 
Vergennes, with a smaller fleet than the British and a 
reluctant ally in Spain, could not accommodate Adams. Adams 
concluded that Vergennes wanted to see America independent, 
but not let it grow strong.134
Vergennes and Adams already had enough to argue about,
John Adams to Samuel Huntington, March 4, 1780, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 98.
131Dull, French Navv and Independence. 178-179.
132John Adams to Samuel Huntington, March 10, 1780, Adams 
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133John Adams to Vergennes, July 13, 1780, Adams Family 
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but Congress added one more issue. On March 18, 1780, 
Congress devalued its worthless paper currency at the rate 
of $40 in paper to one silver dollar. Vergennes asked Adams 
to intercede on behalf of French merchants. Adams saw no 
reason for French merchants to be treated differently from 
anyone else holding Continental paper and refused.
Vergennes had always questioned Adams's loyalty to the 
alliance, and with Adams's actions in the summer of 1780, 
he was convinced of Adams's disloyalty. Vergennes had had 
enough of Adams and asked the Chevalier de la Luzerne, 
Gerard's replacement in America, to ask Congress to recall 
Adams.135 Both Adams and Vergennes appealed to Franklin 
for support against the other. Vergennes leaned on 
Franklin, asking him to put the matter before Congress and 
to urge Congress to respond in a manner pleasing to the 
king.137 Franklin dutifully complied, attacking Adams and 
defending his own policy of stategic flattery. "He [Adams] 
thinks ... that America has been too free in Expressions of 
Gratitude to France," Franklin wrote to Huntington, "I 
apprehend that he mistakes his Ground, and that this Court 
is to be treated with Decency and Delicacy."138
135ibid, 60-63, 69.
136Shaw. Character of John Adams. 139.1 07 '  ;-- ;--------- -' ,
■LJ'Vergennes to Benjamin Franklin, June 30, 1780, in 
Benjamin Franklin. The Writings of Beniamin Franklin, vols. 
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Once again, interest- and personality-based diplomacy, 
represented by Adams and Franklin, clashed. And once again, 
personality-based diplomacy ruled in Paris. According to 
Peter Shaw, "Adams relied ... on a straightforward plethora 
of information, exortation, and argument."13  ^However, 
Versailles was no place for straightforwardness. Adams saw 
little more that he could do in Paris. On July 27, 1780, he 
left to pursue American interests in The Netherlands.140
On September 16, 1780, Adams received permission to 
negotiate with the Dutch until Henry Laurens, the American 
minister to The Netherlands, arrived. Laurens would never 
reach The Netherlands, as the British captured him at sea 
on September 3, leaving Adams as de facto minister.141 
While Adams was in The Netherlands, American interests 
seemed to coincide with Dutch entrance into the Armed 
Neutrality. The Armed Neutrality had its origins in July of 
1778, when an American privateer attacked eight British 
cargo ships sailing out of Archangel, Russia. Catherine II 
of Russia proposed a treaty with Denmark in August, calling 
for mutual protection of neutral ships and British ships 
trading with neutrals. Catherine II issued the Declaration 
of Armed Neutrality on February 28, 1780. Of the five
139Shaw, Character of John Adams. 137-138, 141-144. 
140Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 71-73. 
141ibid, 78-79.
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principles of the Armed Neutrality, the first three, 
freedom of neutrals to trade with belligerents, free ships 
make free goods, and a limited definition of contraband 
that did not include naval stores, appeared in the Model 
Treaty. The fourth principle stated that only an effective 
blockade was legal, and the fifth set the first four as the 
basis for determining the legality of prizes.142
Adams hoped to link the Armed Neutrality to the 
American war effort. If France would not send ships to 
America, perhaps the Northern Powers could tie up the 
British fleet in Europe. Adams reported the formation of 
the Armed Neutrality to Huntington, adding that the Dutch 
were about to join. With a solid bloc of northern neutrals 
against Great Britain, Adams wrote, "either the War will be 
pushed this year with more Vivacity than ever, both by Land 
and by Sea, or that Peace will be made without delay."143 
Congress shared Adams's enthusiasm, and in the summer of 
1780 Congress sent Francis Dana, Adams' secretary, to apply 
for American membership in the Armed Neutrality.144
1 A? , ,
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Events pushed The Netherlands into the Armed Neutrality. 
When the British captured Henry Laurens, they also captured 
evidence of Dutch-American cooperation. The Dutch joined 
the Armed Neutrality for their own protection on November 
20, and the British authorized attacks on Dutch shipping on 
December 20. The Dutch appealed to Russia for help on 
January 12, 1781. Adams hoped that the Armed Neutrality 
would join the war, forcing Great Britain to negotiate for 
peace and lessening American dependence on France. Adams's 
hopes, along with the Armed Neutrality itself, collapsed 
when Russia refused to go to war for the Dutch.145
As Adams tried to expand American contacts, Vergennes 
moved to cut French losses. By February 1781, Vergennes 
believed the American war effort was nearly spent. American 
arms had fared badly in 1780. Charleston fell to the 
British, and Lord Cornwallis and the turncoat Benedict 
Arnold cut deeply into the Carolinas and Virginia. In 
additon, the war put a strain on the French economy. 
Vergennes believed that the United States should settle on 
the grounds of territory possessed. Great Britain would 
give up New York City, but keep Georgia and South Carolina. 
Russia and Austria, neither of which recognized American
145Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution. 79-82, 
93.
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independence, offered mediation, and Vergennes accepted. On 
May 21, 1781, the mediators agreed on four preliminary 
bases for negotiation; l)all proposals would be heard at 
Vienna, and mediation would be extended to Great Britain 
and its American colonies if those parties requested it,
2)Great Britain and the colonies would sign a separate 
peace concurrent with a general peace settlement, 3)during 
negotiations, there would be a one-year truce based on 
territory held, and 4)negotiations would proceed once the
*1 A C
preliminaries had been accepted.
John Adams was the only American diplomat in Europe 
accredited to attend such a peace conference, and Adams did 
not approve of the bases for negotiation. He specifically 
objected to the idea of a truce without a formal peace. 
Adams believed such a truce would only cause another war 
later. Adams also told Vergennes that he could not attend a 
peace conference that did not recognize American 
independence. The mediators referred only to American 
colonies.147 "There are no 'American colonies' at war 
with Great Britain," Adams testily reminded Vergennes, "The 
Power at War is the United States of America."148 By July 
of 1781, the mediators themselves had lost interest in
146Morris, Peacemakers. 178-184.
147ibid. 205-206.
148John Adams to Vergennes, July 19, 1781, Adams Family 
Papers, Letterbook, reel 105.
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mediation.149
Vergennes retained an interest in getting rid of 
Adams. Vergennes had previously ordered Luzerne to 
influence Congress to have Adams recalled. By the summer of 
1781, Luzerne had his chance. Congress, like Vergennes, was 
pessimistic about the military effort. Many in Congress 
believed that Adams was the primary obstacle to peace, and 
Luzerne encouraged this belief. On June 11, 1781, Congress 
voted to order its diplomats in Europe to do nothing 
without the approval of the French. Only Massachusetts and 
Connecticut opposed the order. Congress expanded the peace 
commission to five members on June 14, adding Benjamin 
Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson. 
James Madison delivered the final blow on July 11, when at 
the urging of Luzerne's secretary, Louis Barbe-Marbois, he 
moved that Congress revoke Adams's commission to negotiate 
a commercial treaty. Congress passed the motion 7-2, again 
with only Massachusetts and Connecticut opposed.150 Adams 
received his new commission on August 24.151
While waiting to use his peace commission, Adams
1dQ . . .  .Jonathan R. Dull. A Diplomatic History of the American 
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tended to American interests in The Netherlands. American 
arms, rather than Adams' efforts, led to Dutch recognition. 
The American victory at Yorktown in October 1781 led the 
British Parliament, on February 27, 1782, to prohibit any 
further offensive action in America. The removal of an open 
British threat allowed the Dutch to recognize and sign a 
commercial treaty with the United States.152
In September of 1782 Adams received the call he had 
been awaiting. John Jay informed him that Great Britain had 
acknowledged American independence, and peace negotiations 
could begin.153 Adams believed that he had been beset by 
a multitude of plagues: a weak and unreliable Congress, an 
untrustworthy collegue in Franklin, and a devious ally in 
Vergennes. Despite all of these difficulties, Adams left 
The Hague for Paris to secure peace and American 
independence.
*52ibid. 110-114. 
153ibid. 116.
PART VI
PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE 
1782-1783
By 1782, a war that began as a colonial rebellion 
against British rule had ballooned into a war involving 
several European powers, all with individual war aims that 
were not necessarily in the interest of the United States. 
"The Political Machine that is now in Motion is so vast, 
and comprehends so many nations, whose Interests are not 
easy to adjust," Adams reported to Huntington, "that it is 
perhaps impossible for human understanding to forsee what 
events might occur to disturb it."154 That machine began 
to divide the alliance and make the British more 
concilliatory. Jay and Franklin met with Vergennes on 
August 10, 1782. While Jay objected to the fact that 
British peace commissioner Richard Oswald's commission did 
not recognize American independence, Vergennes did not.
154John Adams to Samuel Huntington, December 6, 1780, Adams 
Family Papers, Letterbook, reel 101.
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Joseph-Matthias Gerard de Reyneval, an advisor to 
Vergennes, added that American claim of the Mississippi as 
the western boundary was extravagant, and Vergennes 
agreed.The meeting convinced Jay that the Americans might 
have to violate their instructions and sign a separate 
peace.155 The Earl of Shelburne, the British prime 
minister, seemed ready to give the Americans what they 
wanted. Great Britain had enough enemies and needed to 
split the alliance. Shelburne believed the territory north 
of the Ohio River was lost. Better to give it to the 
Americans, who would continue to trade with Great Britain, 
than to give it to France or Spain.156
Jay submitted a draft treaty on October 5. It called 
for recognition of American independence and British 
evacuation of American territory. It set American 
boundaries at the Mississippi on the west, 31® north 
latitude on the south, the St. Lawrence River and 45° north 
latitude on the northwest, and the St. John's River to the 
Bay of Fundy on the northeast. The draft gave the United 
States the right to catch and dry fish off Newfoundland, 
and granted free navigation of the Mississippi to Great 
Britain and the United States. Oswald appoved of the
155Morris, Peacemakers. 307-310.
156Dull, Diplomatic History. 145-147.
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treaty, but the cabinet rejected it on October 17. The 
cabinet wanted to keep the Americans out of the fisheries, 
establish a Maine boundary more advantageous to Great 
Britain, and make some provision for American Tories.
John Adams arrived in Paris on October 26. He was still 
suspicious of Vergennes and Franklin, but discovered that 
JaY/ previously connected with the pro-Deane moderates, was 
now anti-French.158 "Mr. Jay likes Frenchmen as little as 
Mr. Lee and Mr. Izard did," Adams noted with some 
satisfaction in his diary, "Our Allies dont play fair, he
1RQ . . .  . .told me."A 3 Adams joined in the negotiations on October 
30, and sessions ran daily until November 4. Great Britain 
accepted the western and southern boundaries. Both sides 
agreed on the St. Croix River as the Maine boundary, but 
could not agree on which of the three St. Croix Rivers that 
meant. In a partial concession to the British, Adams
offered to have Americans pay debts to Britons incurred
1 60 • before 1775. Adams also wrote an article granting the
Americans the right to fish off Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia.161
Fish and Tories remained sticking points. By November 
•^^Morris, Peacemakers. 346-350.
15 Hutson, JA and Diplomacy of American Revolution.
117-119.
1 diary entry of November 5, 1782, in John Adams, Diary 
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11, the British accepted the loss of the northwest. The 
British were willing to exclude the most outspoken American 
Tories from compensation for lands seized, but did insist 
on compensation for neutrals. Adams opposed compensation, 
fearing that it would create British and French parties in 
the United States. The British watered down the demand for 
compensation to an official request, which the Americans 
accepted. 162
The final sessions began on November 25. The 
fisheries, perhaps the main reason John Adams was in 
Europe, remained the final issue. Adams, of course, was 
long familiar with the issue. MMy Practice as a Barrister 
in the Counties of Essex Plymouth and Barnstable had 
introduced me to more Knowledge both of the Cod and whale 
fisheries and of their importance both to the commerce and 
Naval Power of this Country than any other man possessed," 
Adams wrote in his autobiography.163 Adams believed that 
one day the United States would be a great naval power, and 
access to the fisheries was the beginning of that power.
For the next three days, Adams defended American rights to 
the fisheries by the same method he gave advice to 
Vergennes —  he buried Oswald in an avalanche of fact and
162Morris, Peacemakers. 367-369, 372-373.
John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 4:5.
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argument. Adams' main point throughout was that granting 
American rights to the fisheries was safer than making 
concessions to France. The fisheries were a training ground 
for sailors. Was it not safer to allow the Americans to 
addto their tiny navy than to allow the French to add to 
theirs? The fisheries were a great source of profit. If the 
Americans shared in the fisheries, much of their profits 
would wind up in London in trade. Could the British expect 
the same from the French? The fisheries were a source of 
contention. Would it not be better to remove sources of 
Anglo-American conflict and restore trade than to exclude
• . 1 fiAthe Americans and drive them closer to the French?
Adams presented a draft article on November 28 that gave 
the United States the right to take fish on the Grand Bank 
and all other places where Americans used to fish.
Americans would have the liberty to dry fish on Cape Sable 
and the unsettled parts of Nova Scotia.165
On November 29 Adams announced that he could 
never sign a peace that kept Americans out of the 
fisheries.166 The British realized that the negotiations 
had come too far to let them collapse over the fisheries. 
The British reduced the "right" to the coastal fisheries to
•"jlJohn Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 3:72-74.
165Morris, Peacemakers. 376.
1 John Adams, Diarv and Autobiography. 3:81.
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a "liberty," and allowed drying only in uninhabited areas. 
The Americans agreed to the compromise, and signed the 
Provisional Treaty on November 30, 1782.167 Adams was 
pleased with the treaty, even though the American 
negotiators had to violate their instructions to obtain it. 
"The great Interests of our Country in the West and in the 
East are secured, as well as her independence. St. Croix is 
the boundary against Nova Scotia. The Fisheries are very 
safe, the Mississippi and the Western Lands to the middle 
of the Great Lakes are as well secured to Us as they could 
be by England," Adams wrote to James Warren, "All of these 
Advantages we would not have obtained if we had literally 
pursued our Instructions.1,168 Adams also knew that the 
treaty was mainly the work of John Jay. Although the French 
had called him the "Washington of Negotiation," Adams wrote 
in his diary, that title belonged more to Jay.169
The treaty presented Congress with an embarrassing 
problem. It could not repudiate a treaty that met, and even 
exceeded, its demands. Neither could Congress ignore the 
fact that the commissioners openly violated their 
instructions. Robert R. Livingston, the secretary of 
foreign affairs, sent a letter to the commissioners on
167Morris, Peacemakers. 379-381.
John Adams to James Warren, December 12, 1782, in 
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March 25, 1783, praising the treaty but expressing 
disappointment that the American had not consulted the
1 70 • • ,French. /u The commissioners defended their blow for 
independence against the June 1781 instructions. "Since we 
have assumed a Place in the Political System of the World," 
they replied, "let us move like a Primary and not like a
171 •Secondary Planet. "*L'x "It is a Glory to have broken such
. . .  177infamous orders," Adams wrote in his diary. '*
The Americans hoped for better terms, particularly 
regarding American trade with the British West Indies, in 
the final treaty. "The commerce of the West Indies is part 
of the American system of commerce," Adams told Secretary 
Livingston,"They can neither do without us, nor us without
1 7 . .them."-1- However, the British would make no further 
concessions to the Americans. The Provisional Treaty 
brought down the Shelburne ministry. The succeeding 
government, under Lord North and Charles James Fox, 
believed that Great Britain had already given away too 
much, and insisted on excluding the Americans from the West
17 0 . . . .J-'v/Robert R. Livingston to the Peace Commissioners, March 
25, 1783, in Wharton, ed. Revolutionary Diplomatic 
Correspondence. 6:338-340.
John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay to Robert R. 
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172diary entry of February 18, 1783, in John Adams, Diarv 
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Indian trade. On September 3, 1783, negotiators read the 
November 30, 1782, agreement into a general peace 
settlement, ending the war.174
Having spent five years in Europe, John Adams 
concluded that America was well rid of any political 
connection with Europe. "For my own Part I thought America 
had been long enough involved in the Wars of Europe. She 
had been a Football from the Beginning, and it was easy to 
foresee that France and England both would endeavour to 
involve Us in their future Wars,” Adams wrote in his diary, 
"I thought [it] our interest and Duty to avoid [them] as 
much as possible and to be compleatly independent and have 
nothing to do but in Commerce with either of them.”175 
Adams was more convinced than ever that only a balance of 
power could preserve American independence.176 Adams 
adapted a European idea to American ends. Adams hoped to 
tie European nations to American success, making American 
commerce too valuable a commodity to risk in war. Adams did 
believe in the rule of law, but the law of diplomacy was 
often the law of the jungle. Adams believed in the sanctity 
of treaties, but more so in American survival.
?"74Dull, Diplomatic History. 159-160.
175diary entry, November 11, 1782, in John Adams, Diarv and 
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Adams wrote to Elbridge Gerry the day he signed the 
final treaty. To maintain its independence, Adams wrote, 
the United States must be able to defend itself. It must 
strenthen its union and depend on its own resources rather 
than the goodwill of Europe. The United States should send 
ministers that will defend American interest, and support 
them to the fullest.177 If the United States did all of 
this, she would control rather than be contolled by the 
balance of power. Then she would be independent.
1 7John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, September 3, 1783, in 
Wharton, ed. Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence. 
6:669-670.
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